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Nietzsche and/or Arendt?
Vasti Roodt
Introduction
In recent years, a number of philosophers and political theorists have
pointed to Nietzsche’s influence on various aspects of Arendt’s thought.
It is possible, for instance, to recognise traces of Nietzsche’s thinking in
Arendt’s theory of action, her valuation of appearance, her rejection of
‘the social question’, her critique of utilitarianism and her generally crit-
ical stance towards modernity1. Nevertheless, it should be equally clear to
any serious reader that there are many respects in which these two think-
ers stand opposed to one another. In this paper, I shall defend the para-
doxical claim that Nietzsche and Arendt could  indeed, should  be
read together precisely in light of their very opposition to one another.
Hence, instead of trying to force Nietzsche and Arendt into the straitjack-
et of mutual consistency, I shall focus on the central conflict between
their projects and approaches. This conflict can be variously described
as the conflict between the life of the mind and life in the world  in
Arendt’s terms, the vita contemplativa and the vita activa  or the conflict
between the philosopher and the political thinker, which itself mirrors the
ancient conflict between the philosopher and the polis. Moreover, this
conflict is itself a crucial theme in both Nietzsche’s and Arendt’s respec-
tive works2. Hence Nietzsche famously maintains that ‘anyone who has
the furor philosophicus will have no time whatsoever for the furor polit-
icus’ and that ‘[any] philosophy that believes that the problem of exis-
tence can be altered or solved by a political event is a sham and pseudo-
philosophy. […] How could a political innovation possibly be sufficient
1 For a summary of some of these arguments, see the essay by Dana Villa elsewhere
in this volume.
2 Nietzsche discusses this tension in various other contexts. See for instance SE for
an extended treatment of the opposition between philosopher and polis, as well
as HH 235, 438, 465. In Arendt’s case, the essay entitled ‘Philosophy and Truth’
in BPF provides an extensive account of this tension, as does her essay on ‘Phi-
losophy and Politics’ (1990).
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to make human beings once and for all into contented dwellers on this
earth?’ (SE 4).
Arendt agrees with Nietzsche that the very nature of the furor philo-
sophicus stems the philosopher antagonistic towards the furor politicus, al-
though she generally thinks that this reflects badly on philosophers rather
than on those who concern themselves with politics. What is more, both
thinkers bemoan the suspension of this very conflict in the modern
world. Thus Arendt laments that ‘[in] the world we live in, the last traces
of this ancient antagonism between the philosopher’s truth and the opin-
ions of the market place have disappeared’ (BPF 235)3, while remarking
later on that ‘it is only by respecting its own borders that [the political]
realm … can remain intact, preserving its integrity and keeping its prom-
ises’ (BPF 263–4, my italics). Nietzsche in turn offers a telling note that
contains the following indictment of modern philosophy: ‘it destroys be-
cause there is nothing to hold it in check. The philosopher has become a
being who is detrimental to the community. He destroys happiness, vir-
tue, culture, and ultimately himself ’ (30[8] 7.733 f.).
In light of these remarks, it seems to me that a good argument for
reading Nietzsche and Arendt together would have to take the conflict
between them  and, by implication, the conflict between philosophy
and politics  seriously, and then go on to demonstrate how this conflict
can be made fruitful for understanding their respective projects. The
point of such an argument would be to read Nietzsche and Arendt to-
gether precisely by remaining true to the opposition between them.
This is the argument I intend to make.
I shall begin by situating this conflict in the context of Nietzsche’s
and Arendt’s shared criticism of modernity as the most iniquitous in-
stance of the moral interpretation of the world. I then turn to their re-
spective attempts at overcoming this interpretation, together with the re-
sentment of the world that has been bound up with it. My aim here is to
demonstrate that what is at stake in the opposition between Nietzsche
and Arendt is the inescapable conflict between two notions of reconcili-
ation between self and world: a worldly – or political – reconciliation
(Arendt), and a much more radical, philosophical notion of reconcilia-
tion (Nietzsche), that ultimately does away with all distance between
self and world. In order to make this claim, I investigate Nietzsche’s con-
ception of amor fati in part two of my paper, which I then contrast with
Arendt’s notion of amor mundi in part three. In the fourth and final part,
3 The full titles of Arendt’s texts
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I try to show how the opposition between amor fati and amor mundi re-
lates to the conflict between the furor philosophicus and the furor politicus.
My intention in this concluding section of the paper is not to force a
choice between these two alternatives  hence: Nietzsche or Arendt, phi-
losophy or politics  but precisely to argue the importance of maintain-
ing the conflict between these two dispositions towards the world and of
availing ourselves of Nietzsche and Arendt while doing so.
1. The desert
For the purposes of my argument, I want to suggest that we situate
Nietzsche’s and Arendt’s respective critiques of modernity  modern phi-
losophy and politics included  within a particular metaphorical land-
scape. This is the landscape of the desert. We find in both thinkers a di-
agnosis of modern existence as desert existence, characterised by the twin
experiences of homelessness and loneliness. To inhabit a desert is to lack a
home  more accurately, to lack a sense of home  understood both as a
locus of security and as a place to which one belongs and from where one
is able to relate to others. Nietzsche writes, for instance, of ‘[t]he tremen-
dous surging of human beings on the great desert of the earth, their
founding of cities and states, their warmongering, their restless congrega-
tion and opposition, their running through one another, their copying
from one another, their contradictory outwitting and stepping down
on one another, their shouting in distress, their pleasure in fighting’
(SE 5). Elsewhere he refers to ‘the last human beings sitting on the
dried-out desert of the decayed earth [Denken wir uns den letzten Men-
schen auf der ausgedçrrten Wste des morschen Erdballs sitzen]’ (29[181]
7.706). Arendt similarly characterises the modern world as a desert.
More precisely, she argues that it is in fact the very absence of a world
– the worldlessness – of modern existence that casts us back on ourselves,
on our basic species existence, our animality, and thereby relegates us to a
desert-existence4.
Both Nietzsche and Arendt develop an account of the conditions
under which the world has become a desert in just this sense. I only
4 Perhaps the most poignant evocation of the desert can be found in her conclusion
to an unpublished lecture course from 1955 entitled ‘The History of Political
Theory’ reprinted as the Epilogue in The Promise of Politics, 201–204.
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want to pick out one strand of argumentation that spans both their ac-
counts. Nietzsche and Arendt agree that the process of desertification is
bound up with the moral interpretation of the world that underlies
our philosophical, political and religious tradition. On this interpreta-
tion, the contingent world that circumscribes human existence is to be
valued only for the sake of some external, non-contingent ground or prin-
ciple. This is what is at stake in the age-old schism between the true world
and the apparent world, being and appearance, which has informed our
tradition from its inception.
The predicament of modernity as identified by Nietzsche and Arendt
both is that we have lost the unquestioning belief in any such ultimate
ground, any definitive ‘for the sake of ’, while we are nevertheless still
plagued by the continued longing for precisely such a ground. This is
the paradox of the modern condition, which Nietzsche captures in the
well-known formula: ‘the world as it ought to be does not exist, and
the world as it is, should not exist’ (WP 585; cf. 9[60] 12 297 f.). Arendt
herself points out that ‘[the] end of a tradition does not necessarily mean
that traditional concepts have lost their power over the minds of men’
(BPF 26). We are still in thrall to the most basic assumption of the
very tradition that no longer binds us, namely the belief that the world
that circumscribes our existence must be redeemed from its contingency
by an eternal standard of value. With the loss of such a standard, we have
lost a world of unquestionable meaningfulness, in which we could also be
unquestionably ‘at home’. What remains is the world in which we actual-
ly exist, but which now appears entirely bereft of meaning; a world that is
in no way a home to us, and in which it has become impossible to endure
our own existence. Nietzsche recognises this resentment at the bottom of
a wide range of symptoms, such as cultural decline, the emergence of the
‘last man’, the proliferation of petty politics, utilitarianism, socialism, etc.
In Arendt’s account, the worldlessness of modern human beings is direct-
ly related  though not always causally so  to the rise of mass society
and the political horrors of totalitarianism.
While it is important to understand this critical aspect of their think-
ing, I want to devote the rest of this paper to the positive aspect of
Nietzsche’s and Arendt’s critical enterprise, namely the overcoming of
the moral interpretation of the world and the resentment that springs
from it. Given the nature of resentment, this overcoming would have
to entail a reconciliation with the world that is no longer predicated
on principles, categories, or ‘yardsticks’ derived from a tradition that
has lost its validity for us. Stated differently, if the resentment that in-
Vasti Roodt376
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
forms the moral interpretation is directed against the world as it is given
to us, the overcoming of such resentment would involve coming to love
the world as it is. And indeed, both Nietzsche and Arendt hold out a vi-
sion of redemption from resentment that is predicated on love: amor fati
and amor mundi, love of fate and love of the world.
It might strike us  and correctly so  that the love of fate is both
more abstract and more encompassing than love of the world, and that
Nietzsche’s proposed project of overcoming must therefore be different
in kind to that of Arendt. This difference might have to do with their
conflicting diagnoses of the locus of the desertification of the world.
Arendt writes in this regard:
The modern growth of worldlessness, the withering away of everything be-
tween us, can also be described as the spread of the desert. That we live
and move in a desert-world was first recognized by Nietzsche, and it was
also Nietzsche who made the first decisive mistake in diagnosing it. Like al-
most all who came after him, he believed that the desert is in ourselves,
thereby revealing himself not only as one of the earliest conscious inhabitants
of the desert but also, by the same token, as the victim of its most terrible
illusion. (PrP 201)
To illustrate Arendt’s point, here is Nietzsche on the desert :
The desert grows: woe to the one who harbours deserts !
Stone grinds against stone, the desert ensnares and strangles,
Glowing brown monstrous death stares
And chews,  its life is its chewing …
Do not forget, human, consumed by lust:
you – are the stone, the desert, are death … (DD 6.387)5
I now want to explore the opposition between Nietzsche and Arendt as
demonstrated by these two citations by relating it to the notions of
amor fati and amor mundi in sections 2 and 3 of my paper.
2. Nietzsche: amor fati
We have seen that Nietzsche diagnoses the resentment that is embedded
in our philosophical and religious tradition and which has persisted in
modernity as a symptom of the moral interpretation of the world. On
this interpretation, the world and everything that belongs in it is to be
5 See also Z IV Daughters of the Desert 2.
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loved for the sake of some external principle (‘creator’, ‘idea’, ‘truth’), in
so far, but only in so far, as the world bears the imprint of this higher re-
ality. The predicament of modernity is that we have lost the unquestion-
ing belief in any such ultimate ‘for the sake of ’, which has left the world
and our existence within it bereft of meaning. In Nietzsche’s account,
overcoming this predicament does not depend on discovering yet another
ultimate purpose, such as ‘progress’, ‘peace’, ‘justice’, ‘universal brother-
hood’ or whatever new gods we should like to devise for ourselves, but
in overcoming the moral interpretation of the world altogether. Against
a moral interpretation that measures the world as it is against the
world as it ought to be and finds it wanting, Nietzsche advocates a reval-
uation of all values from a standpoint beyond the good and evil of tradi-
tional morality. As part of this revaluation process, he posits an ‘illogical
original relationship with all things’ (HH 31). On this view, everything
exists by virtue of its relationship to everything else and there is no exter-
nal ‘for the sake of ’ to which such existence must conform.
While I cannot argue this here, I would contend that Nietzsche’s
theory of the will to power is an attempt to think this illogical relation-
ality of all to all. The most important point for our purposes is that
Nietzsche tries to argue, contra the moral interpretation of the world,
that the rejection of any aspect of existence amounts to the rejection of
all of it, since there is no way of separating out any aspect of reality
from the force-field of power-wills to which it belongs. The converse
also holds: to care for anything at all and to will it to exist requires
one to affirm the existence of everything that exists (Z IV Drunken
Song 10).
The highest form of affirmation that explicitly wills the existence of
everything that exists in eternal entanglement is love. Nietzsche’s formula
for this affirmation is amor fati  the love of fate: ‘that one wants noth-
ing to be other than it is, not in nature, not in the future, not in the past,
not in all eternity. Not merely to endure that which happens of necessity,
still less to dissemble it  all idealism is untruthfulness in the face of ne-
cessity  but to love it …’ (EH Clever 10). In fact, it seems that the cen-
tral idea of amor fati is loving that which is necessary – and Nietzsche de-
scribes it in this way on more than one occasion (see, for instance, 15[20]
9.643; 16[22] 9.664). This attitude is not a mere passive acceptance of
the world as we find it, but to will the world to be as we find it, knowing
that the whole of our existence  including the very fact of our willing 
is bound up with it. On this view, we are manifestly implicated in the fate
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of the world and the love of fate also means to love the world as our fatal-
ity.
Against this background, the vision and the riddle of eternal recur-
rence can then be understood as this same conception of the illogical re-
lationality of all to all, applied to time. Hence Nietzsche, by mouth of
Zarathustra, presents us with a vision of the ‘moment’ as a knot which
ties together everything that was necessary for it to exist and everything
that will follow from its existence6. Instead of a moral-teleological
time-conception in which what is is always justified with reference to
some final intention, Nietzsche offers a view in which the ultimate pur-
pose of existence is achieved in every moment7.
On this reading, the conjunction of the thought of eternal recurrence
and amor fati cannot be said to amount to a new categorical imperative
along the lines of: live your life in such a way that you can will it to return
eternally. In the first place, it is not merely one’s own life that is in play
here, but the whole of existence, the best and the worst of it. We cannot
select what to affirm and what to exclude from affirmation. Secondly,
precisely because we ourselves are bound up with all that is, we are not
the masters of our own lives. We do not stand over and against fate,
against the world, freely deciding to form our lives one way rather
than another. Nietzsche’s concern is with our perspective  affirmative
or negating  towards the one reality of which we are part, and this re-
ality is not a static condition or set of facts, but everything that is in its
ever-changing relationality of all to all. Nietzsche thus confronts us with
the most radical reconciliation with the world that does away with the
distance between self and world altogether, as well as with any distinction
between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, instant and eternity, particular and universal. In
the words of Eugen Fink (2003 213): ‘Man dissolves in universal becom-
ing; the world concentrates itself into man’.
In light of these insights, one could argue that Nietzsche’s conception
of redemption from resentment entails a personal transformation or con-
6 ‘Must not all things that can run have already run along this lane? Must not all
things that can happen have already happened, been done, run past? […] And
are not all things bound fast together in such a way that this moment draws
after it all future things? Therefore  draws itself too?’ (Z III Vision).
7 Nietzsche writes in an unpublished note: ‘Becoming must be explained without
recourse to final intentions; becoming must appear justified at every moment (or
incapable of being evaluated, which amounts to the same thing); the present
must absolutely not be justified by reference to a future, nor the past by reference
to the present’ (WP 708, cf. 11[72] 13.34).
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version from ‘experience’ to ‘innocence’. This innocence is not goodness,
but rather a perspective from ‘beyond good and evil’ that no longer
weighs and measures the world with reference to an unconditional
‘ought’ to which it must conform8. We find this transformation clearly
captured in Beyond Good and Evil 56, as well as in an unpublished
note, where Nietzsche evokes the name of the god Dionysus to describe
this supreme affirmation that follows upon the most extreme negation:
Such an experimental philosophy as I live anticipates experimentally even the
possibilities of the most fundamental nihilism; but this does not mean that it
must halt at a negation, a No, a will to negation. It wants rather to cross over
to the opposite of this  to a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is,
without subtraction, exception, or selection  it wants the eternal circula-
tion:  the same things, the same logic and illogic of entanglements. The
highest state a philosopher can attain: to stand in a Dionysian relationship
to existence  my formulation for this is amor fati. (WP 1041; cf. 16[32]
13.492 f.)
It should be clear, therefore, that Nietzsche envisages the escape from the
desert as a philosophical project. The world is not to be transformed by
what we do in it, but by transforming ourselves by means of a philosoph-
ical thought-experiment. On this view, the overcoming of resentment re-
quires overcoming the desert in oneself. Upon this self-overcoming, one
would no longer be homeless, because one would feel oneself at home ev-
erywhere, no longer lonely, because one would be diffused with the sense
of one’s intimate relation to everything else.
It is precisely in this conception of the most appropriate means for
overcoming resentment that Nietzsche comes into conflict with Arendt.
In the same text in which she pointedly opposes Nietzsche’s diagnosis
of the origin of the desertification of the world, she writes:
What went wrong is politics, our plural existence, and not what we can do
and create insofar as we exist in the singular: in the isolation of the artist, in
the solitude of the philosopher, in the inherently worldless relationship be-
tween human beings as it exists in love and sometimes in friendship  when
one heart reaches out directly to the other, as in friendship, or when the in-
between, the world, goes up in flames, as in love. (PrP 202)
And yet, I have indicated that Arendt’s attempt to overcome the moral
interpretation of the world is also predicated on love. How then are we
8 Arendt herself considers the eternal recurrence Nietzsche’s ‘final redeeming
thought’ precisely in so far as it proclaims the ‘Innocence of all becoming’ (die
Unschuld des Werdens) and with that its inherent aimlessness and purposelessness,
its freedom from guilt and responsibility’ (LM VOL. II 170).
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to understand her notion of amor mundi, and how does it differ from
Nietzsche’s more radical and encompassing conception of amor fati?
3. Arendt on amor mundi
In a letter to her old teacher Karl Jaspers, Arendt writes: ‘I’ve begun so
late, really only in recent years, truly to love the world […] Out of grat-
itude, I want to call my book on political theories [the book that would
become The Human Condition] Amor Mundi’ (AJC 264). In light of this
remark, we can begin to see that, to love the world, for Arendt, is a matter
of our relations with one another in the world rather than a matter of self-
transformation. Furthermore, her notion of amor mundi has an undeni-
able political dimension.
For Arendt, the world is the realm in which human beings appear,
not as instances of biological life, but as individuals. That is to say, the
world is a space of appearances, in which we appear to one another in
our distinctness rather than in our sameness as members of a biological
species. This ‘space’ is not only constituted by the durable things we fab-
ricate and by which we surround ourselves, but also by the fragile net-
work of relations that springs up between human beings when we engage
in action and judgement.
What would it mean, then, to love the world in all these facets? More
importantly, perhaps, why should we love the world in any of them? Any
attempt to make sense of Arendt’s notion of amor mundi must do so
against the background of her interpretation of the concept of love in
St. Augustine. The most important idea she takes over from Augustine
is that in birth we enter a world that is ‘strange’ to us because it exists be-
fore us. At the same time, we are also strangers to the world; ‘newcomers’
to a play that is not of our own making, and for whom there are no
scripted parts. In this sense the world is not a home to us, but an unfa-
miliar environment in which we, as newcomers, perforce must live9. For
Arendt, the question is not how to escape the world into which we enter
as strangers, but precisely how to reconcile ourselves to it. In her disser-
tation on Augustine, she makes much of the notion that our being in the
world does not yet make us of the world (LA 66); the mere fact of our
being-here does not yet make ‘here’ into home.
9 Arendt points to Augustine understanding of ‘the particular strangeness in which
the world as a “desert” (eremus) pre-exists for man’ (LA 67).
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In Arendt’s analysis, it is precisely the inability to reconcile ourselves
to a world that precedes us and that will outlast us  a world that there-
fore does not coincide with our specific arrival in it  that has led to the
twofold flight from the world into an eternal realm (which is also Augus-
tine’s solution) and into the self (which is the specific solution that char-
acterises modernity). In the context of our present discussion, one might
argue that both of these flights are merely two different manifestations of
an underlying resentment towards a world in which we are not perfectly
at home. Against this background, amor mundi can then be understood as
a way of reconciling ourselves to the world by fitting ourselves into it 
that is to say, by making ourselves at home where we are not. In this re-
gard, Arendt’s argument is diametrically opposed to the notion that we
can only be at home in the world by fabricating  which generally
means: by destroying and remaking  the world in accordance with
human needs and interests. Her point, in other words, is not that we
can be more at home if only we work harder at making the world con-
form with our requirements, but rather by choosing to fit ourselves
into a world that is not in the first place ‘for us’. Thus to love the
world is in the first place to choose the world as one’s home: ‘it is through
love of the world that man explicitly makes himself at home in the world,
and then desirously looks to it alone for his good and evil. Not until then
do the world and man grow ‘‘worldly’’’(LA 67). In an unpublished lecture
entitled ‘Basic Moral Propositions’, Arendt remarks that ‘it is love of the
world that fits me into it, in so far as it determines to whom and to what I
belong’10.
Again appealing to Augustine, Arendt proclaims on more than one
occasion that ‘there is no greater assertion of something or somebody
than to love it, that is to say: I will that you be  Amo: Volu ut sis’
(LM VOL. II 104). On this view, love is the very opposite of possession
or assimilation, both of which only understand the object of love as an
extension of the one who loves. Moreover, in an earlier reference Arendt
speaks of ‘the great and incalculable grace of love’ which nevertheless does
not depend on our ‘being able to give any particular reason for such su-
preme and unsurpassable affirmation’ (OT 301, my italics). Clearly, then,
this affirmation of something or someone cannot be brought about by
argument, persuasion or threat. Rather, it is a matter of ‘grace’.
10 This quotation is from an unpublished lecture entitled ‘Basic Moral Proposi-
tions’, container 41, p024560, Library of Congress, cited by Beiner (1992 173
fn 149).
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If we assume the love of the world to entail precisely such an affirma-
tion without ultimate justification, as I am doing here, we can begin to
see how amor mundi stands in contrast to resentment. To resent the
world as it is given springs precisely from wanting the world to be
other than it is, or from the view that the world has not provided one
with a good enough reason for loving it. As in the case of Nietzsche’s vi-
sion of amor fati, Arendt also fails  or refrains  from providing such
reasons. To make the point in a rather pedestrian way, we might say that
Arendt recognises, as Nietzsche does, that we cannot be argued into love;
it can only be stated as a possibility to which we either do or do not re-
spond. This is also the relevance of her reference to ‘gratitude’ in the Jas-
pers letter quoted above: the fact that the world calls up love in us is
something to be thankful for precisely because it cannot be willed.
Nevertheless, while both Arendt and Nietzsche understand love in
this sense of affirmation without an appeal to further grounds, which
in both thinkers stand as the counter-force resentment, there is an impor-
tant difference between their respective approaches. Whereas, as we have
seen, Nietzsche conceives of amor fati as the most extreme affirmation of
everything that is, to the point of wishing its eternal recurrence, Arendt’s
conception of love is best understood under the two-fold banner of dis-
crimination and moderation. While, like Nietzsche, she advocates an un-
conditional affirmation of the world, this is nevertheless not an uncritical
affirmation. That is to say, it is an affirmation that does not refrain from
asking whether any aspect of or appearance in the world ‘pleases’ or ‘dis-
pleases’. This discriminating love is not conditional upon the world con-
forming to any external principle or yardstick. It says, rather: because I
love the world it matters to me what appears in it, and therefore I shall
take a stand with regard to the things in it. One might say that, in Arendt,
the extremity of the love of the world that would indiscriminatingly af-
firm the world in all its aspects, is tempered by care for the world 
which is of course itself a kind of love  and that this care expresses itself
in judgement and discrimination.
This understanding of what Arendt means by loving the world casts a
different light on her concern with our ‘reconciliation’ with the world.
Certainly, this reconciliation stands as a counterpart to the resentment
that has fuelled the ‘world alienation’ characteristic of modernity (HC
254), but it nevertheless does not involve a complete identification of
self and world. For Arendt, to love the world does allow a measure of rec-
onciliation with it, ‘but ironically, which is to say, without selling one’s
soul to it’ (MDT 14). As I have interpreted her here, Arendt’s conception
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of amor mundi retains the distance between self and world that Nietzsch-
e’s notion of amor fati dissolves. This does not mean that she conceives of
us as in any way independent of the world, but rather that she considers a
certain distance from the world as a precondition for exercising our
judgement about what should and should not be allowed to appear in it.
With regard to this conception of amor mundi, Arendt remains a po-
litical thinker  that is to say, a thinker of the polis, the arena of human
affairs. The relevant point in this regard is that the world that conditions
our existence can itself only exist on the basis of certain limits and con-
ditionalities. To think politically, which is precisely to concern oneself
with this very world, is therefore to set boundaries, draw distinctions,
to discriminate  not in the first place because excess, lack of discrimi-
nation or unconditional attitudes and actions threaten our souls, but be-
cause they threaten the world that lies between us. Arendt wants us to rec-
ognise that an excessive, indiscriminate love of the world can bring it to
ruin as much as indiscriminate resentment, in so far as radical affirmation
prevents us from taking a stand against anything; from the judgement
that ‘this ought not to have happened; this must not be allowed to hap-
pen’. In simple terms: the world of human affairs, which is not the con-
text of the solitary philosopher but the context in which we speak and act
together with our fellows, can only survive if we learn to love it within the
limits of political judgement.
In the next and last part of my paper, I want to explore the contrast
between Nietzsche’s conception of amor fati and Arendt’s conception of
amor mundi in relation to the conflict between philosophy and politics.
Although it might seem at this point as if we could only justifiably speak
of Nietzsche or Arendt, not Nietzsche and Arendt, this last part of my
argument is also designed to demonstrate to what extent Nietzsche and
Arendt remain related in their very opposition to one another.
4. Furor philosophicus, furor politicus
The best route into the conflict between the furor politicus and the furor
philosophicus is provided by Arendt’s essay, ‘Philosophy and Politics’.
Here, the conflict between these two enterprises is traced back to the orig-
inal conflict between the philosopher and the polis, which in turn is co-
equivalent with the emergence of philosophy as a distinct mode of ques-
tioning. In Arendt’s view, the conflict did not arise because the philoso-
pher and the citizens had radically different and incompatible interests,
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but precisely because a philosopher  Socrates  wanted to make philos-
ophy relevant for the polis (PP 443). She argues that Socrates wanted to
help his fellow citizens become better citizens by helping them discover
the truth of their own doxa – that is, the truth in the different ways in
which the world opened itself to each of them (PP 433). However, this
Socratic enterprise carried a particular danger for the citizens and the
polis, and it was this danger that became the source of the conflict be-
tween them. The danger in Socrates’ attempt to help the citizens of Ath-
ens think through their doxai was simply the discovery of the groundless-
ness of these very opinions, once they have been thought through to the
end. To state the point in Nietzschean terminology: to discover the truth
of one’s own doxa is to discover that there is no truth. Arendt writes in
this regard:
The search for truth in the doxa can lead to the catastrophic result that the
doxa is altogether destroyed, or that what had appeared is revealed as an il-
lusion. This […] is what happened to King Oedipus, whose whole world,
the reality of his kingship, went to pieces when he began to look into it.
After discovering the truth, Oedipus is left without any doxa, in its manifold
meanings of opinion, splendor, fame, and a world of one’s own. Truth can
therefore destroy doxa, it can destroy the specific political reality of the citi-
zens. Similarly, from what we know of Socrates’ influence, it is obvious that
many of his listeners must have gone away, not with a more truthful opinion,
but with no opinion at all. The inconclusiveness of many Platonic dialogues
[…] can also be seen in this light: all opinions are destroyed, but no truth is
given in their stead. (PP 442)
By reason of this destructive impact on the opinions by which we navi-
gate in the world, the philosopher indeed poses a danger to the polis, not
only for the Athenian citizens of Socrates’ day, but for all of us in so far as
we are inhabitants of the world and not dwellers in the realm of ideas.
For without any trust in our opinions  what Arendt refers to as our
‘common sense’  it is not possible to live together in the world. Nietz-
sche understands this very well: ‘Without untruth there can be neither
society nor culture. The tragic conflict. Everything that is good and beau-
tiful depends on illusion: truth kills  indeed, it kills itself (insofar as it
recognises that its foundation is error)’ (29[7] 7.623). And it is perhaps
not by accident that he lays a moving soliloquy on loneliness in the
mouth of Oedipus:
I call myself the last philosopher because I am the last human being. No-one
speaks to me except I myself, and my voice comes to me as the voice of
someone who is dying. Let me still commune with you for only an hour, be-
loved voice, with you, the last trace of the memory of all human happiness;
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with your help I will deceive myself about my loneliness and lie my way into
plurality and love; for my heart refuses to believe that love is dead; it cannot
bear the shudder of the loneliest loneliness and it forces me to speak as if I
were two.
Do I still hear you, my voice? You whisper when you curse? And yet your
curse should cause the bowels of this world to burst ! But it continues to
live and merely stares at me all the more brilliantly and coldly with its pitiless
stars ; it continues to live, as dumb and blind as ever, and the only thing that
dies is  the human being. (19[131] 7.460 f.)
What Oedipus as ‘the last philosopher’ and ‘last human being’ learns is
that philosophy is the loneliest of all enterprises precisely because it de-
stroys all doxa  opinion, splendor, fame, and a world of one’s own 
and thereby destroys the precarious grounds for all human togetherness.
However, in Arendt’s account there is also a second way in which phi-
losophy and the opinions of the world are in conflict with one another,
which can be characterised in terms of a conflict between wonder and
common sense. The conflict here has to do with the origin of philosoph-
ical questioning versus the origin of the opinions by which we navigate in
the world. In simple terms, the difference is that philosophical thinking
originates outside the world of human affairs  which of course does not
mean that this thinking does not concern itself with the latter  while
opinions originate in the world we share with one another. Arendt argues
that the original experience that gives birth to the philosopher’s question-
ing is the experience of thaumazein: ‘the wonder at everything that is as it
is’ (PP 449). This experience is not wonder at any particular thing in the
world which subsequently calls up the wonder at everything else. Rather,
the philosopher’s thaumazein is a kind of ‘shock’, in which ‘Man in the
singular, as it were, is for one fleeting moment confronted with the
whole of the universe, as he will be confronted again only at the moment
of his death’ (PP 450–1). Arendt recognises this moment of shock in
Nietzsche’s description of the philosopher as ‘a man about whom extra-
ordinary things happen all the time’ (PP 450). Nietzsche himself refers
to the philosopher as ‘a human being who constantly experiences, sees,
hears, suspects, hopes, and dreams extraordinary things; who is struck
by his own thoughts as from outside, as from above and below, as by
his type of experiences and lightning bolts’ (BGE 292). At issue here is
not so much the content of philosophical thinking itself, but the original
experience that gives rise to this mode of thinking and questioning. This
experience does not itself originate in the world of human affairs in the
course of speech and action, but springs from a wonder that is itself a
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kind of astonishment, a bolt of lightning, ‘a flying spark between two
flint stones’ (PP 451). This ‘spark’ is neither an ultimate truth that can
be grasped, nor an immediate understanding of anything at all. The
only result of this experience can be expressed as: ‘Now I know what it
means not to know; now I know that I do not know’ (PP 449). And
for Arendt, ever an admirer of Socrates, it is this pathos of not-knowing
that is the origin of the ultimate questions of philosophy.
At the same time, however, it is the very experience of wonder that
brings the philosopher in conflict with the ‘common sense’ of the
polis. The difficulty here is twofold. In the first place, the experience
of thaumazein strikes the philosopher in his or her singularity and there-
fore leaves him or her permanently at odds with the polis in so far as the
latter is the realm of human plurality, which only exists in the endless play
of opinions. In the second place, this moment of wonder is not an expe-
rience in the world that springs from any particular thing within it. As a
confrontation with ‘all that is’, it is an experience that is ‘speechless’; that
is to say, it cannot be translated into the ‘common sense’ language of ev-
eryday speech without sounding like ‘non-sense’ (PP 451).
At this point, it is worthwhile to revisit the two conflicting concep-
tions of redemption presented by Nietzsche and Arendt in the light of
our analysis of the difference between philosophical and political think-
ing. I would suggest that Nietzsche’s vision of the eternal recurrence and
amor fati is best understood as an attempt on his part to capture some-
thing of the original philosophical experience of thaumazein. That is to
say, his notion of a reconciliation with the world that dissolves all boun-
daries between self and world, immanence and transcendence, is an at-
tempt to effect a return to something of the original ‘shock’ or ‘flying
spark’ of wonder at everything that is as it is. Since, as we have seen,
this experience of wonder does not originate in the world where we
live together in the manner of speech, it is a thought that is indeed in-
communicable and ungraspable, but Nietzsche is not somehow ‘at
fault’ for this. We will not be able to make sense of this vision of redemp-
tion as long as we treat it as an opinion among other opinions that must
somehow compete with them for our allegiance. From a ‘common sense’
perspective, Nietzsche’s vision of Dionysian affirmation and bermens-
chlichkeit indeed seems like ‘non-sense’, but this is not the perspective
from which Nietzsche addresses us. He is not trying to persuade us to
change our opinion about the world; he is trying to convey an experience
of wonder before which all resentment of what is, all difference between
self and world, all wanting anything different, even opinion itself, disap-
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pears. As such, it is indeed a vision of something  which is of course no
‘thing’, but a sensibility, an experience, a thought-event  that lies be-
yond the human condition. In so far as we as we try to understand
what Nietzsche is saying from within this condition, we are bound to mis-
understand him. It is only to the extent that we are able to imagine the
experience from which his vision of redemption springs that we might
grasp something of what this vision itself would entail.
This understanding of the background to Nietzsche’s thinking also
throws new light on the conflict between his conception of redemption
and that of Arendt. The main point for consideration here is that this
conflict should not be couched in terms of an ‘either-or’. It is not a matter
of a head-on confrontation over the ‘right’ way to overcome the resent-
ment of the world, but rather of different perspectives that stand in ten-
sion with one another that cannot be resolved in one direction or another.
There are two reasons why this conflict cannot and should not be re-
solved. In the first place, we should keep in mind that it is precisely by
way of the conflict between them that each keeps the destructive force
of the other in check. We have already seen that the kinds of thinking
and questioning that spring from the philosopher’s initial experience of
wonder are destructive of the world because they undermine the very
opinions by which the world opens itself to us. As such, this questioning
destroys the conditions for human living-together in the world in so far as
the latter depend on the provisionality and plurality of opinions. More-
over, the unconditional affirmation of all that is and of the world as part
of that one reality also undermines the conditions for taking a stand with
regard to anything in the world, which in its own way can be equally de-
structive. However, there is a danger to the world from the side of com-
mon sense and opinion as well. To exist in a wholly immanent world in
which it is generally taken for granted that there is something rather than
nothing, in which opinions are never confronted with their own ground-
lessness and where the flying spark of wonder never halts us in our tracks
is a world that has been reduced to the kind of organised living-together
that both Nietzsche and Arendt denigrate as ‘the life of society’. As Dolan
(2004 273) puts it: ‘When the tension between common sense and the
wonder at being is destroyed, we enter the bleak realm of the ‘social’,
of programmed life and poll-tested politics’. This socialised existence is
not a form of reconciliation with the world; it is, instead, an indifference
towards it, which no longer cares to ask whether we are ‘at home’ in the
world or not, ‘pleased’ or ‘displeased’ with what appears in it. In our own
time, it is perhaps this indifference, far more than the explosive events of
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the death of God and the despair of nihilism, that indicates that the
world has become lost to us.
The second reason why the conflict between the two notions of rec-
onciliation with the world represented by Nietzsche and Arendt cannot
be resolved is that the conflict does not merely lie between these two
thinkers; it also exists within ourselves. In so far as we are both ‘of the
world’ and therefore formed by as well as constitutive of the world’s plu-
rality and singular beings who at times withdraw from the world, both
kinds of thinking  and thus both kinds of reconciliation  are of rele-
vance to us. As beings who live with others, we need to learn to love the
world ‘within the limits of political judgement’. However, in so far as we
are not only with others, but also with ourselves, we may hope, in a rare
moment, to be struck by the ‘flying spark’ of Nietzsche’s ‘Dionysian af-
firmation’ of the world as it is, without subtraction, exception, or selec-
tion’. Perhaps we might say that, to experience both kinds of reconcilia-
tion with the world  which nevertheless cannot be reconciled with one
another  is to realise what Nietzsche calls the ‘uncanny difference within
us’ (GS 369) and to which Arendt refers as our ‘inner plurality’.
It is therefore my contention that a joint reading of Nietzsche and
Arendt such as I have attempted here confronts us precisely with this nec-
essary conflict between wonder and common sense, between loving the
world in unconditional affirmation and loving it within the limits of po-
litical judgement, both for the sake of the difference that we are and for
the sake of the world to which we belong.
In conclusion, however, it must be admitted that the conflictual rela-
tionship between Nietzsche and Arendt is still more complex than I have
portrayed it here. We have seen that Arendt considers Nietzsche a philos-
opher who has made the very experiences of homelessness and loneliness
that characterise modern desert existence into the subject of his own re-
flection, and whose proposed overcoming of these conditions involved a
flight inwards, a philosophical self-experiment conducted in solitude.
And yet, paradoxically, it is precisely in this very flight into solitude
that Arendt recognises the beginning of genuine political thinking on
Nietzsche’s part. She writes:
Nothing is more difficult and rarer than people who, out of the desperate
need of loneliness, find the strength to escape into solitude, into company
with themselves, thereby mending the broken ties that link them to other
men. This is what happened in one happy moment to Nietzsche, when he
concluded his great and desperate poem of loneliness with the words: ‘Mit-
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tags war, da wurde eins zu zwei, und Zarathustra ging an mir vorbei’. (ONT
359)11
For Arendt, the recognition of one’s inner plurality – that I myself am not
one but always at least two – is a precondition for acknowledging the plu-
rality of the world in which we necessarily exist in relation with and dis-
tinction from others. And it is the recognition of plurality in this sense
that is the condition for all genuine politics, and consequently also the
proper focus for political thinking. In light of this passage, it seems
that Nietzsche represented for her that rare instance of one whose furor
philosophicus  the withdrawal from the world in order to think  con-
tained the kernel of the furor politicus.
I therefore want to conclude by suggesting that perhaps Arendt was
something of a Nietzschean after all – both because he acted as a foil
against which she could develop many of her own ideas, but also, para-
doxically, because for her he represented at least the possibility of the be-
ginning of a genuine political philosophy. On this reading, Nietzsche was
not a political philosopher in what he had to say about politics, but rather
in what he had to say about the plurality of self and world. And, as
Arendt writes in the concluding passage of her essay on philosophy
and politics : ‘If philosophers, despite their necessary estrangement from
the everyday life of human affairs, were ever to arrive at a true political
philosophy they would have to make the plurality of man, out of
which arises the whole realm of human affairs  in its grandeur and mis-
ery  the object of their thaumadzein’ [sic] (PP 453).
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